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Abstract 
In this paper we are interested in the social choice theory of allocating resources, which 
are available and can be consumed in integer units only. Since goods are available in 
integer units only, the social choice theory for such problems cannot exploit any 
smoothness property, which may otherwise have been embedded in the preferences of the 
agents. This makes the outcome function approach for the study of such problems quite 
compelling. Our purpose here is to study outcome functions, which are efficient and 
consistent. We provide an example to show that the competitive social choice function 
may not be converse consistent. The competitive outcome function is easily observed to 
be efficient, consistent and converse consistent. What we are able to show here is that any 
efficient and consistent outcome function which is “reasonably well-behaved” for two-
agent problems, must be a sub-correspondence of the competitive outcome function. Our 
proof of this result requires the converse consistency of the competitive outcome 
function. 
 
1. Introduction: The axiomatic theory of resource allocation among a finite number of 
agents is concerned with the analysis of rules, which map preference profiles and initial 
endowments to desirable feasible allocations. While much of received theory has favored 
the rule, which selects competitive allocations, the associated competitive price vector 
has by and large not appeared as an explicit outcome of social choice, though it 
invariably plays a significant role in the relevant proofs. An exhaustive survey of the vast 
literature on this topic is the one by Moulin and Thomson (1997). 
The reason why prices do not appear as explicit outcomes either in the statements of the 
theorems or axioms in received theory, is because the conventional model deals with 
perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences, which may also be smooth. Smooth 
convex preferences and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics are 
often invoked in the proofs to determine a set of unique price vectors. However the price 
vector being an intermediate device in the argument can usually be suppressed in the 
statement of the results. 
An alternative approach for the study of resource allocation mechanisms, dating back to 
the seminal work of Hurwicz (1973), does require price to be an explicit outcome of 
  1interactive communication. A comprehensive account of developments in this direction is 
available in Campbell (1987). The idea there is agents announce messages, which an 
“outcome function” translates into allocations. Recent literature on mechanism design, 
often refer to the outcome function as a “game form”. While mechanism design does not 
insist that messages should be preferences and/or endowments, it allows for mechanisms 
where such information may be required from the agents. Mechanisms where agents 
communicate preferences are known as revelation mechanisms. In this paper we use the 
term “outcome function” to refer to the rule which associates with each preference profile 
and initial endowment a set of price-allocation pairs. 
We are here interested in the social choice theory of allocating resources, which are 
available and can be consumed in integer units only. Bundle auctions as discussed in 
Bhickchandani and Mamer (1997) is an example of such resource allocation, where 
exactly one unit of every resource is available. If in addition no bundle is preferred to its 
best item, i.e. the worth of a bundle is equal to the worth of its best item, then the analysis 
relates very naturally to the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). 
Existence of competitive equilibrium in such models is especially problematic. Even in 
the special case investigated by Bhickchandani and Mamer (1997), competitive 
equilibrium need not exist. However, in the assignment game set up of Shapley and 
Shubik (1972) a competitive equilibrium always exists. The importance of competitive 
equilibrium in resource allocation problems, lies in that competitive outcomes belong to 
the core of the corresponding market game as defined and discussed in Shapley and 
Shubik (1969, 1976). Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive 
equilibria in integer allocation problems, referred to here as discrete concave market 
games, are investigated in Yang (2001) and Sun and Yang (2004). 
Since goods are available in integer units only, the social choice theory for such problems 
cannot exploit any smoothness property, which may otherwise have been embedded in 
the preferences of the agents. This makes the outcome function approach for the study of  
such problems quite compelling. Our purpose here is to study outcome functions, which 
are efficient and consistent. 
That chosen alternatives include a statement about prices, does not automatically restrict 
the outcome function to agree with the one that selects competitive outcomes only. There 
are a large number of extremely reasonable and well-known non-competitive price 
mechanisms in the literature on rationing, which can be accommodated within this 
framework. In fact any feasible allocation along with any price vector is a possible 
outcome. 
Efficiency requires a feasible allocation to yield the maximum possible output. 
Consistency of a chosen allocation requires that it continues to be chosen in any reduced 
or sub-problem. Fortunately, the competitive social choice function is both efficient as 
well as consistent. A third property known as converse consistency of a social choice 
function says that if a feasible allocation for a given problem is a chosen allocation for 
every two-agent sub-problem, then it is also a chosen allocation for the original problem. 
In the divisible goods case the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 
along with the smoothness of preferences of preferences is used to prove that the 
competitive social choice function is converse consistent. When goods are available in 
integer units only, such a method cannot be applied. We provide an example to show that 
the competitive social choice function may not be converse consistent. On the other hand, 
  2if we approach the problem using outcome functions, then we are able to retrieve a 
considerable amount of lost ground. 
An outcome is efficient if its allocation is. A chosen outcome is consistent for a problem 
if it continues to be chosen for all sub-problems. A feasible outcome for a given problem 
is converse consistent if whenever it is a chosen outcome for all two-agent sub-problems, 
it becomes a chosen outcome for the original problem as well. 
The competitive outcome function is easily observed to be efficient, consistent and 
converse consistent. What we are able to show here is that any efficient and consistent 
outcome function which is “reasonably well-behaved” for two-agent problems, must be a 
sub-correspondence of the competitive outcome function. Our proof of this result requires 
the converse consistency of the competitive outcome function. Hence, by invoking 
efficiency and consistency, we can do no better than the competitive outcome function, 
provided that the outcome function is “reasonably well-behaved”, for two-agent 
problems. 
There is a related literature on allocating goods available in integer amounts along with 
money, where competitive equilibrium correspond exactly with the set of envy free 
allocations. If the entire initial endowment is socially owned then at competitive prices 
each agent is required to pay the worth of its consumption of inputs and receives the 
average worth of the initial endowment. It is easily observed from a discussion available 
in Lahiri (2005) that the resulting pay-offs to the agents are envy-free: no agent could do 
better by seeking the input consumption bundle of another agent. In this framework, 
Bevia (1996) studies consistency in the multi-commodity framework, where one unit of 
each commodity is available for re-distribution. In the many input situation, Tadenuma 
and Thomson (1991) show that if a sub-solution of the envy-free solution satisfies 
neutrality (i.e. names of inputs don’t matter) and consistency, then it is in fact the envy 
free solution. Further, Tadenuma and Thomson (1993) show that if there is one input 
available in integer units, then the winner’s curse solution is the finest sub-solution of the 
no envy solution. A comprehensive survey of the use of consistency in axiomatic 
resource allocation is available in Thomson (2004), wherein a significant step in the proof 
that is used to establish our main result is referred to as “The Elevator Lemma”. 
 
2. The Model: This section builds on the framework developed in Lahiri (2005).  
Let N = א∪{0}, where א denotes the set of natural numbers. A non-empty set P of ℵwith 
cardinality greater than or equal to two denotes the set of potential agents. Suppose there 
are L+1 > 1 commodities. The first L commodities are used as inputs to produce the 
L+1
th commodity, which is a numeraire consumption good.  
A function f: N
L→ℜ is said to be monotonically non-decreasing if for all x,y∈N
L: x ≥ y 
implies  f(x) ≥ f(y). 
A function f: N
L →ℜ is said to be discrete concave if there exists a continuous concave 
function g: → ℜ  such that the restriction of g to N
L
+ ℜ
L coincides with f. 
A discrete concave market game is a pair <{f
i/i∈I}, w> such that: 
(i) I is a non-empty subset of P with cardinality greater than or equal to two, denoting the 
set of agents in G; 
(ii) w∈N
L is the aggregate initial endowment vector of inputs available to the agents; 
(iii) for all i∈I: f
i is a monotonically non-decreasing discrete concave production function 
representing the preferences of agent i∈I. 
  3The analysis in Lahiri (2005) was carried out in a fixed population framework and under 
the additional assumption that w ∈N
L∩ . Since the current investigation concerns a 
variable population framework, the axioms invoked will require that the initial 
endowment of one or more input may be zero. 
L
+ + ℜ
Let Ω denote the set of all discrete market games, a generic element of which is denoted 
G. 
Given a discrete concave market game G = <{f
i/ i∈I }, w>, for j = 1,…,L, let wj be the 
aggregate amount of commodity j that is available in the economy.  
Given a discrete concave market game G = <{f
i/ i∈I }, w>: 
(a) An input consumption vector of agent i is denoted by a vector X
i ∈N
L. 
(b) An allocation is an array X = <X
i/ i∈I > such that X
i∈N
L for all i∈I. 
(c) An allocation X = <X
i/ i∈I > is said to be feasible if ∑
∈I i
i X = w. 
Given G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈Ω, an allocation X feasible for G and a non-empty subset J of 
I, the reduced game of G with respect to J at X, denoted  is defined to be the discrete 





i X >. 
Any non-empty subset Ω
0 of Ω is called an admissible domain if it satisfies the following 
property: [G = <{f
i/ i∈I }, w>∈Ω






Notation: Given G∈Ω, we denote the set { / (φ≠) J ⊂ I, X feasible for G} by Ω(G) 






Clearly both Ω(G) and Ω
2(G) are admissible domains. Let us verify that Ω(G) is an 
admissible domain.  
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i for all i∈J, X*
i = X
i for all i∈I \ J. Thus, X* is 











Thus, Ω(G) is an admissible domain. 
That Ω
2(G) is an admissible domain, follows from its definition. 
A social choice function on an admissible domain Ω
0 is a correspondence S: Ω
0 






0 and X∈ S(G): X is a feasible allocation for G. 
The domain of S which is Ω
0 in this case, is denoted dom(S). 
We do not require a social choice function to be non-empty valued. 
A price vector p is an element of  \{0}, where for j = 1,…,L, p
L
+ ℜ j denotes the price of 
input j. Clearly a price vector does not allow all inputs to be available for free. 
An outcome for a discrete concave market game G is an ordered pair (X,p) where X is a 
feasible allocation for G and p is a price vector. 
  4An outcome function on an admissible domain Ω
0 is a correspondence F: Ω
0 








0 and (X,p)∈F(G): (X,p) is an outcome for 
G. 
The domain of F which is Ω
0 in this case, is denoted dom(F). 
We do not require an outcome function to be non-empty valued. 








F(G) = {X/ there exists p such that (X,p)∈F(G)}. 
Clearly, SF is a social choice function. 
An outcome (X,p) for G = <{f







Tx for all x∈N
L. 
If (X,p) is a competitive outcome for G, then X is said to be a competitive allocation for 
G and p is said to be a competitive price vector. 
An outcome function F
* such that for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> ∈dom(F*): F*(G) = {(X,p)/ 
(X,p) is a competitive outcome for G}, is said to be a competitive outcome function.   
* F S is said to be a competitive social choice function. 
A feasible allocation X*  = <X*
i/ i∈I > is said to be efficient for G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>, if 
≥  , whenever X = <X ∑
∈I i
i i X f ) * (  ∑
∈I i
i i X f ) (
i/ i∈I> is any feasible allocation for G. 
A social choice function S is said to be efficient if for all G∈dom(S): X∈S(G) implies X 
is efficient for G. 
An outcome function F is said to be efficient if the corresponding social choice function 
SF is efficient. 
 
If I and J are non-empty subsets of P with I ⊂ J and X ∈(N
L)




3. Consistency and Converse Consistency of Social Choice and Outcome Functions: A 
social choice function S is said to be Consistent (or satisfy Con) if for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, 
w>∈dom(S), (φ≠)J ⊂ I: [X∈S(G),  ∈ dom(S)] implies [X
X
J G J∈S( )].  
X
J G
A social choice function S is said to be Converse Consistent (or satisfy CCon) if for all G 
= <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom(S), and X feasible for G: [XJ∈S( ), for all (φ≠)J ⊂ I, with |J| = 




Proposition 1:   is efficient and satisfies Con. However, it does not satisfy CCon.  * F S
 
Proof: That   is efficient is easily established (Lahiri [2005]).   * F S
Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom( ), (φ≠)J ⊂ I,  ∈dom(S) and X∈  (G). Thus, there 
exists a price vector p such that (X,p)∈ F*(G). 
* F S
X
J G * F S






Tx for all x∈N
L. 






Tx for all x∈N
L. 
Since, <X
i/i∈J> is feasible for  , (X
X
J G J,p) ∈ F*( ), i.e. X
X
J G J ∈  ( ).  * F S
X
J G
  5Thus,   is consistent.   * F S
To show that that   is not Converse Consistent we construct the following example, 
which has a similar motivation as the one used in the proof of Proposition 2 of Ergin 
(2000), in that both use a pattern similar to the one that is used to exhibit the Condorcet 
Paradox.  
* F S




3(e2) = 1.25, f
1(e2) = f
2(e1) = f
3(e3) = 1, f
1(e3) = f
2(e2) = f
3(e1) = 0; f
i(x) = 
1.25 for all x ∈ N






Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> and dom(SF*) = Ω(G) ≡ Ω
2(G). 
Let X be the feasible allocation where X
1 = e2, X
2 = e1, X
3 = e3.  
Let J = {1,2} and p
J = e1 + 0.75e2. Then, (X
J, p
J) ∈F*( ), i.e. X
X
J G J ∈  ( ).  * F S
X
J G
Let J = {1,3} and p
J = e2 + 0.75e3. Then, (X
J, p
J) ∈F*( ), i.e. X
X
J G J ∈  ( ).  * F S
X
J G
Let J = {2,3} and p
J = 0.75e1 + e3. Then, (X
J, p
J) ∈F*( ), i.e. X
X
J G J ∈   ( ).  * F S
X
J G










and <ei/ i = 1,2,3> is feasible for G. Thus, X∉  (G). Q.E.D.  * F S
 
An outcome function F is said to be Consistent (or satisfy Con) if for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, 
w>∈dom(F), (φ≠)J ⊂ I: [(X,p)∈F(G) and  ∈ dom(F)] implies [(X
X
J G J, p)∈F( )]. 
X
J G
An outcome function F is said to be Converse Consistent (or satisfy CCon) if for all G = 
<{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom(F), and outcome (X,p) for G: [(XJ,p)∈F( ), for all (φ≠)J ⊂ I, with 




Proposition 2: F* is efficient and satisfies Con and CCon. 
 
Proof: That F* satisfies efficiency and Con are easily verified, by methods similar to the 
ones adopted in the proof of Proposition 1. 
Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom(F*), and let (X,p) be an outcome for G. Suppose 










L. Hence, (X,p)∈F*(G). 
Thus, F* satisfies CCon. Q.E.D. 
 
4. Efficiency and Competitive Outcomes: The proof of the following proposition is 
available in Lahiri (2005). 
Proposition 3: Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom(F*), (X*,p)∈F*(G) and let X be an efficient 
allocation for G. Then, (X,p)∈F*(G). 
 
Proposition 3 implies the following: 
Proposition 4: Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈dom(F*). Then [F*(G) ≠ φ] implies F*(G) = {X/ 
X is efficient for G}×{p/ p is a competitive price vector for G}. 
 
As a consequence of Proposition 3, we obtain the following important result: 
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Theorem 1: Let S be an efficient social choice function with dom(S) = dom( ). Then 
for all G∈dom(S) with F*(G) ≠ φ(or equivalently  (G) ≠ φ): S(G) ⊂   (G). 
* F S
* F S * F S
 
A discrete concave market game need not have a competitive outcome.  
 
Example 1: Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> with |I| = 2, w = 3, L = 1. For i∈I, let f
i(x) = x for x 
∈{0,1}; f
i(x) = 1 for x ≥ 1. If p > 0, then f
i(x) – px = 0 if x = 0, 
                                                                                 = 1 – px for x ≥ 1. 
Thus, for p∈(0,1), the profit of each agent is maximized at x = 1. For p > 1, profit is 
maximized at x = 0. Hence the total requirement of the commodity never exceeds 2. 
Clearly, G does not have a market equilibrium. 
Yang (2001) and Sun and Zang (2004) provide necessary and sufficient conditions under 
which a discrete concave market game possesses a competitive outcome. 
 
An admissible domain Ω
0 is said to be Agreeable for Two-Agents  if for all G = <{f
i/ 
i∈I}, w>∈Γ
2 with |I| = 2, G has a competitive outcome. 
F is said to be Non-Empty valued for two-agents if for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ dom(F) 
with |I| = 2, F(G) ≠ φ. 
F is said to satisfy Non-discrimination for two-agents if for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ 
dom(F) with |I| = 2: [X∈SF(G), X' feasible for G and ∑
∈I i
i i X f ) (=   ∑
∈I i
i i X f ) ' ( ] implies 
[X'∈SF(G)]. 
 
Neither of the two properties mentioned above implies the other. The outcome function 
which is identically the empty set, satisfies Non-discrimination for two-agents, but 
violates Non-empty valued for two-agents. 






0 be the set {G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>/ I is a finite 
subset of P with |I| ≥ 2, w∈N
L and for all i∈I and x∈N
L: f







agreeable for two-agents. 
For G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ Ω
0 with |I| ≠ 2, let F(G) = F*(G). For G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ Ω
0 
with |I| = 2, if I = {i,k} with i < k, then let F(G) = (X,p*), where X
i = w and X
k = 0. 
















i i X f ) (=
∑
∈I i
i i X f ) ' ( . However, X'∉SF(G). Thus, F does not satisfy Non-Discrimination, although 
F is non-empty valued for all two-agent problems. 
 
Observation: Let F be an outcome function with dom(F) = dom(F*) = Γ
2.  
Suppose F is Efficient, Non-empty valued for two agents and satisfies Non-
discrimination for two agents. Further suppose dom(F) = dom(F*) is agreeable for two 
agents.  
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i/ i∈I}, w> ∈ dom (F) with |I| = 2. 
Suppose X∈SF*(G). Since F is non-empty valued for two-agents SF(G) is non-empty. 
Since F satisfies efficiency, X'∈SF(G) implies X' is efficient for G. Since F* is efficient, 
X is efficient for G. Since F satisfies Non-discrimination for two-agents, X∈SF(G).  
Hence, SF*(G) ⊂ SF(G). 
Since dom(F) = dom(F*) is agreeable for two-agents, by Theorem 1, SF(G)⊂ (G).   * F S
Thus, SF*(G) = SF(G). 
 
5. The Main Result: In this section we show that the competitive outcome function on 
domains which are agreeable for two-agents is the coarsest outcome function which 
satisfies efficiency, consistency and the following property. 
 
F is said to satisfy the Two-Agent Price Property if for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ dom(F) 
with |I| = 2 and all (X,p) ∈F(G): [X is a competitive allocation] implies [(X,p) is a 
competitive outcome]. 
 
Theorem 2: Let F be an outcome function with dom(F) = dom(F*) being Agreeable for 
Two-Agents. If F is efficient and satisfies Con and Two-Agent Price Property then for all 
G∈dom(F): F(G) ⊂ F*(G). 
 
Proof: Suppose F is efficient and satisfies Con and Two-Agent Price Property. Further 
suppose dom(F) = dom(F*) being Agreeable for Two-Agents. 
Let G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> ∈ dom (F). 




J∈SF( ), for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2. Since dom(F) = dom(F*) is Agreeable for Two-
Agents, by Theorem 1, S
X
J G
F( )⊂ ( ) for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2. Thus, X
X
J G * F S
X
J G J∈  ( ) 




J is a competitive allocation for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2. By 
Two-Agent Price property, (XJ,p)∈F*( ), for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2. 
X
J G
Since by Propostion 2, F* satisfies CCon, it must be the case that (X,p)∈ F*(G). 
Thus, F(G) ⊂ F*(G). Q.E.D. 
 
Note: That the common domain of F and F* is agreeable for two-agents is not a 
superfluous assumption.  
For instance if Ω
0 = {G} where G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> with |I| = 2, w = 3, L = 1, then Ω
0 is 
admissible though not agreeable, since as we saw in Example 1, there is no competitive 
outcome for G. Let p* =  . Then, F such that F(G) = {X/ X is an efficient allocation 
for G}×{p*}, is efficient and satisfies Con and Two-Agent Price Property, since F*(G) = 








Proposition 5: There exists an outcome function F, with dom(F) = dom(F*) being 
Agreeable for Two-Agents, such that F is efficient and satisfies Con, CCon and Two-
  8Agent Price Property and yet F(G) is a non-empty proper subset of  F*(G) for all G = 
<{f










0 be the set {G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>/ I is a finite subset of P with 
|I| ≥ 2, w∈N
L and for all i∈I and x∈N
L: f






0 is agreeable for two-
agents. 
For G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ Ω
0, let F(G) = {(X,p*)}, where X
i = w if i = min{k/k∈I}, X
i = 0, 
otherwise. 
Clearly, F(G) ⊂ F*(G) for all G∈Ω
0 and F satisfies all the desired properties including 
CCon. 
For G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w>∈ Ω
0, let X' be the feasible allocation such that X'
i = w if i = 
max{k/k∈I}, X'
i = 0, otherwise. 
(X',p*)∈F*(G) for all G∈Ω
0. 
However, for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> ∈dom(F), with w∈  and |I| ≥ 2, (X',p*) ≠ (X,p*). 
L
+ + ℜ
Hence, F(G) is a non-empty proper subset of  F*(G) for all G = <{f
i/ i∈I}, w> ∈dom(F), 




Observation: Suppose that F is an outcome function which is efficient, non-empty 
valued for two-agents and satisfies Non-discrimination for Two-Agents and Two-Agent 
Price Property. Suppose SF satisfies Con and CCon. 
Let G∈dom(F) and X∈SF*(G). 
By Con of SF* (established in Proposition 1), XJ∈SF*( ), for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2.  
X
J G
Thus, for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2: XJ is an efficient allocation for  . Since F and hence S
X
J G F 
is efficient and non-empty valued for two-agents for all J ⊂ I, with |J| = 2: SF( ) is 
non-empty and every allocation in S
X
J G
F( ) is efficient for  . By Non-discrimination of 





J∈ SF( ). By CCon of S
X
J G F: X∈SF(G). 
Thus, SF* ⊂ SF. 
 




1.  Bevia, C. (1996): “Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in 
economics with indivisible goods”, Social Choice and Welfare 13: 113 – 126. 
2.  Campbell, D.E. (1987): “Resource Allocation Mechanisms”, Cambridge 
University Press. 
3.  Ergin, H. (2000): “Consistency in House Allocation Problems”, Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 34: 77-97. 
4.  Hurwicz, L. (1973): “The Design of Mechanism for Resource Allocation”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No:2: 1 – 30. 
  95.  Lahiri, S. (2005): “Manipulation via Endowments in a market with profit   
maximizing agents”, (mimeo). 
6.  Moulin, H. and W. Thomson (1997): “Axiomatic Analysis of resource 
allocation”, in      Social Choice Re-examined, (K. Arrow, A. Sen, K. Suzumura, 
eds.), London: Mc Millan: 101-120. 
7.  Shapley, L. and M. Shubik (1969): “On Market Games”, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 1: 9-25. 
8.  Shapley, L. and M. Shubik (1972): “The assignment game 1: the core”, 
International Journal of Game Theory, 1: 111-130. 
9.  Shapley, L. and M. Shubik (1976): “Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of 
Market Games”, International Journal of Game Theory, 4: 229-237. 
10. Sun, N. and Z. Yang (2004): “The Max-Convolution Approach to Equilibrium 
Models with Indivisibilities”, (mimeo). 
11. Tadenuma, K. and W. Thomson (1991): “No-envy and consistency in economies 
with indivisible goods”, Econometrica 59: 1755-1767. 
12. Tadenuma, K. and W. Thomson (1993): “The fair allocation of an indivisible 
good when monetary compensations are possible”, Mathematical Social Sciences 
25: 117-132.  
Thomson, W. (2004): “Consistency and its Converse: an Introduction”, paper 
prepared for a NATO Advanced Research Institute entitled “Game Theory and 
Resource Allocation: the Axiomatic Approach”. 
14. Yang, Z. (2001): “A Practical Competitive Market Model for Indivisible    
Commodities”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1317, Cowles 
Foundation For Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, 
Connecticut. 
 
 
  10